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Article 8

THE FICTIVE
ORIGINS OF
SECULAR
HUMANISM
Justin Neuman
The Enchantress of Florence by
Salman Rushdie. New York:
Random House, 2008. Pp. 368.
$26.00 cloth.

Shortly before the novel’s release in
the United States, the Sunday edition of the New York Times hailed
Salman Rushdie’s The Enchantress
of Florence as a work of serious literary ambition destined to draw
critical and popular attention back
to Rushdie’s prose and away from
the political and personal imbroglios
that have overshadowed his fiction
since 1989. As of yet, this has not
been the case; early reviews were
mixed at best, and though it is undeniably a captivating and compulsively
readable book, The Enchantress of
Florence eschews the significant stylistic innovation and overt, highstakes cultural commentary that
energizes Rushdie’s The Satanic
Verses (1988). Instead, Rushdie’s
newest novel seeks sanctuary in the
mirror of history—in this case, a
mirror veiled in gauzy multiculturalist platitudes. Despite its preening, The Enchantress of Florence
proves an essential book; in its
strongest moments, The Enchantress of Florence repudiates linear,
Eurocentric histories of the Renaissance and conjures in their stead
a synchronous world of parallel
realities in which the seeds of secular humanism flower not once but
twice—once in northern Italy and
simultaneously in northern India.
Read reparatively, Rushdie’s novel
invites us to reconsider axiomatic
tenets about modernity, secularism,
and humanism—chief among them
the relation between the ethos of
modernity and the rejection of an
enchanted world.
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In terms of genre, The Enchantress of Florence is a globe-traversing
prose romance about the vicissitudes
of love, power, and storytelling—a
romance dressed in the guise of an
impeccably researched historical
novel (complete with an extensive
bibliography). The book’s opening
vignettes transport the reader, along
with a golden-haired stranger, by
bullock cart into Fatehpur Sikri,
the city built by the Mughal emperor
Akbar the Great in the sixteenth
century. The stranger, who calls
himself Mogor dell’Amore (the
“Mogul of Love”) and whose real
name is Niccolò Vespucci—cousin of
Amerigo and namesake of Niccolò
Machiavelli—has journeyed from
his birthplace in the New World
via Florence to Mughal Hindustan
with a story he will reveal only to
Emperor Akbar himself. Gaining
entry to the Mughal court through
a series of bold stratagems, feats
of linguistic virtuosity, and magic
tricks, Mogor dell’Amore garners
the favor of Akbar and so begins
the teasing, digressive weaving and
unweaving of a story that captivates
the emperor for longer than Scheherazade plied Shahryar with her
tales in The Arabian Nights. The
story that emerges unites the lives of
three Florentines (Niccolò Machiavelli, Antonino Argalia, and Ago
Vespucci) with Akbar’s dynasty by
way of an intrepid princess named
Qara Köz (“Lady Black Eyes”)—
the tragic heroine of Niccolò’s tale
and the erstwhile enchantress of
Florence.

Fictive and real, Florence and
Hindustan, East and West evolve
as parallel worlds—as “mirrors” of
one another, to use one of the
novel’s favorite metaphors. But so
enthralled is the novel with symmetry, parallel, and simultaneity
(“We are their dream . . . and they
are ours,” as one character puts it)
that The Enchantress of Florence
underplays points of contrast (48).
Rushdie’s depiction of the birth
of modernity in the budding secular humanisms of Florence and
Mughal India severs the link—
common to Renaissance selfunderstanding and to centuries of
subsequent scholarship—between
the rise of humanist sensibilities and
the recovery of classical antiquity.
According to regnant narratives
of the Enlightenment, in fourteenthcentury and fifteenth-century Florence the pietistic, feudal social matrix
of medieval Christianity deformed
in the crucible of the city-state under
the twin pressures of mercantile
capitalism on the one hand and a
revival of classical aesthetics on the
other. Individualism, the emergence
of linear temporality, and a powerful critique of Christianity depend
in no small part on the scholarly
methods of textual analysis, hermeneutics, and archival research pioneered by Italian humanists in the
fifteenth century—all of which
parallel a steady repudiation of the
enchanted world of medieval Christendom. Not only can no equivalent milieu of forces be found in
Mughal India, Rushdie’s depiction

ON RUSHDIE’S THE ENCHANTRESS OF FLORENCE
of Florence rejects the disenchantment thesis wholesale, marginalizes classicism and capitalism, and
devotes itself instead to the realpolitik of the Medici family and Florentine sexual libertinism. Indeed,
though oblique references to the
mercantilism and trade that fueled
the rise of the Italian city-states register in the interstices of the tale,
trade (other than the trade of women)
is equally distant from Rushdie’s
evocation of humanism in Italy and
Hindustan.
Nor is Rushdie’s point the one we
might expect him to make; namely,
that “renaissance” (as the rediscovery of the science, philosophy, and
aesthetics of antiquity and the
rebirth of Europe) cannot describe
an Islamic culture that never lost
Hellenism in the first place. Nor
should The Enchantress of Florence
be read as a leap aboard the alreadycrowded “multiple modernities”
bandwagon—the striking thing
about the way Rushdie portrays
Sikri and Florence and the characters who inhabit them is how
fundamentally similar they are in
attitude, bodily comportment, belief,
and ethos. As Akbar philosophizes,
“The curse of the human race is not
that we are so different from one
another, but that we are so alike” (311,
original italics).
Returning to the plot, Niccolò
and Rushdie fill their tales with
adventure, violence, and sex, all held
in place by the point de capiton
of the historical record. In Niccolò’s tale, the Florentine Antonino

677

Argalia journeys east, is captured
by the Ottomans, becomes an
invincible Janissary general, and
captures Qara Köz and her mirrorimage slave girl (both of whom call
themselves Angelica) after defeating the Persian shah (who had, in
turn, won her from the Mughals in
another battle). Returning triumphant to Florence after several
decades, Argalia discovers how
mutable titles like hero and traitor,
enchantress and witch, can become
in moments of political expedience.
After Argalia dies protecting his
love and her mirror, the women
flee to the New World under Ago
Vespucci’s protection in the final
phase of Qara Köz’s westward
exile—a journey cast as a failed
attempt to find, like Columbus, a
route to the East in the journey
west. In a tangled genealogy that
results in Niccolò insisting he is the
emperor’s uncle (though Akbar is a
much older man), Qara Köz turns
out to be Akbar’s great aunt, a
princess expunged from the
Mughal historical record for the
sin of casting her lot first with the
Persian king and then with his vanquisher, Antonino Argalia, “the
Turk.”
What then, we must ask, are the
nature and status in The Enchantress of Florence of ideas like humanism and secularism, refracted as they
are by Rushdie’s idiosyncratic representation of Mughal Hindustan
and Medici Florence? In several
important ways, Rushdie’s novel
conforms to mainline accounts of
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secularization (as entailing the retreat
of religion from public life paired
with the decline of individual belief )
and of humanism (epitomized by a
commitment to beauty as the ultimate aesthetic value, a commitment
paired with a recentering of life
around worldly affairs and individual reason). None of the principal characters of the novel believe
in God, either Christian, Muslim,
or otherwise. Instead, religions are
an object of scholarly and comparative interest: Akbar establishes a
commission to “count and name . . .
every worshiped divinity of Hindustan, not only the celebrated,
high gods, but all the low ones
too” (139). Akbar, like the elite of
Florence to whom he is compared,
“trusted beauty, painting, and the
wisdom of his forebearers. In other
things, however, he was losing confidence; in, for example, religious
faith” (57).
Reflecting dominant theories of
secularization, in The Enchantress
of Florence religions have lost their
normative force but retain cultural
influence on private life and social
structure: as Akbar tells Niccolò,
“[T]he austere religion of our father
will always be ours, just as the carpenter’s creed is yours” (139). The
public sphere of Sikri is nominally
secular in this simple sense. Committed to ending sectarian strife in
Muslim-ruled Hindustan, Akbar
flirts with atheism: “Maybe there was
no true religion,” muses the emperor,
a man who “wanted to be able to tell
someone of his suspicion that men

had made their gods and not the
other way around,” and who suspects, moreover, that “it is man at
the center of things, not God” (81,
original italics). As he riffs expansively on pre-Socratic relativism in
the diction of Renaissance Europe,
Akbar circles toward a more properly humanist ambition: to “have
no other temples but those dedicated to mankind . . . to found the
religion of man” (81).
If a simultaneous but disconnected humanist ethos attracts
Rushdie to the Mughal Empire and
Florence in the late 1500s, the genealogy, meaning, and effects of these
humanist visions—and the nature
of their relation to one another—
remain unclear. Divorced from
mercantile capitalism and classicism,
secular humanism stands, in The
Enchantress of Florence, on three
equally precarious legs. The first is,
ironically, absolute rule: the humanism of Akbar’s Mughal Empire
depends on one charismatic autocrat’s pragmatic but hardly necessary response to the demands of
administering a multicultural and
religiously diverse empire. An emergent humanism is performed in his
sovereign decrees, and it achieves
its most lyrical evocations in his
private meditations. Whereas both
Christianity and Islam have wielded
the sword of empire and offered
transcendental justification for the
work and rhetoric of domination,
Rushdie’s Akbar sees pluralism as
an effective structural principle of
enduring dominion. The novel’s
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critiques of religion emerge from
the relativizing power of this pluralism and from the distancing effect
facilitated by a religiously diverse
world whose figures travel extensively. When Akbar queries his chief
advisor, an observant Brahmin,
looking for philosophical defenses
of atheism, Birbal puts the case
well: “All true believers have good
reasons for disbelieving in every
god except their own . . . and so it
is they who, between them, give
me all the reasons for believing in
none” (44).
Conjuring Akbar’s fictional persona offers Rushdie an opportunity
to indulge his penchant for hyperbole and to showcase the charming
side of megalomania: Akbar is “the
Grand Mughal, the dusty, battleweary, victorious, pensive, incipiently overweight, disenchanted,
mustachioed, poetic, oversexed, and
absolute emperor” (30). More importantly, he is a walking paradox: “As
a boy he had killed a tigress with
his bare hands and then, driven to
distraction by his deed, had forever
forsworn the eating of meat and
become a vegetarian. A Muslim vegetarian, a warrior who wanted only
peace, a philosopher-king: a contradiction in terms. Such was the
greatest ruler the land had ever
known” (33). These contradictions,
it seems, are enough to exceed the
narrow confines of received religion
and enact a poetics of hybridity that
is the most recognizable trope of
Rushdie’s fiction across nine novels
and three decades.
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The second enabling condition for
a humanist ethos in The Enchantress of Florence, and an important
site of convergence between Medici Florence and Akbar’s Sikri,
is an ethos of decadence, sexual
licentiousness, and a thriving public culture of prostitution. While
the autocratic, hierarchical nature
of Akbar’s empire suggests that
Mughal humanism is an epiphenomenon of the sovereign imagination, positing the importance
of physical pleasure as a necessary
condition for an emergent secular
humanism offers a more insightful
and enduring commentary. In Rushdie’s novel, courtesans and brothels
are constitutive elements of the public sphere. The parallel houses of
Skanda and Mars in Sikri and Florence sustain unique salon cultures
that generate a panoply of visual
and literary art while offering sexual permissiveness an alternative
to what Rushdie calls “the stink of
religious sanctimony” (146). Men in
Rushdie’s Florence and Hindustan
worship (and purchase) women—
indeed, much of the novel is devoted
to these activities—who supplant
religion and history as the source
of inspiration for art and action.
The misogynistic implications of
Rushdie’s portrayal of women, a
common refrain in the scholarly
responses to his work, here achieve
a fevered pitch; for a sexually desirable woman like Qara Köz, “poets
reached for their pens, artists for
their brushes, sculptors for their
chisels”—which is to say “that when
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you lay eyes on the pair of witches
[Qara Köz and the mirror] the
desire to fuck them comes upon you
like swine fever” (275, 237).
Finally, and most importantly,
secular humanism in the novel
requires and reflects a certain relationship to narrative we might call
the “novelistic imagination.” The
successful storyteller in The Enchantress of Florence “usurp[s]the prerogative of the gods” in “the creation
of a real life from a dream” (47). In
this formula, not only does a novelistic imagination foster secularization by substituting worldly stories
for those of religion and divinity,
the creative force of authorship casts
man—and they are men in Rushdie’s novel—in the place of God as
creator and sustainer of the world.
Humanism and secularism converge within the compass of telling
and hearing stories while the community of auditors describes the
limits of public discourse just as
surely as political hegemony. In
asserting a link between modernity,
secularism, humanism, and the
novel, we are not yet beyond the
pale of mainline theories of modernity or secularism; indeed, genre
theorists from Ian Watt, Michael
McKeon, and James Wood to
Bakhtin, Lukács, and de Sade agree
that, in their historical origins and
subsequent development, novels are
agents of secularization. In nonfiction prose like the essay “Is Nothing Sacred” in Imaginary Homelands
(1991), Rushdie espouses a similar view, calling literature “the

schismatic Other of the sacred (and
authorless) text,” but adding the
important qualifier that literature
is “also the art most likely to fill our
god-shaped holes” (424).
There is a fundamental, unaddressed tension at the heart of The
Enchantress of Florence—and indeed
in much of Rushdie’s fiction and
prose—between his explicit and
implicit endorsements of secularism, humanism, and pluralism, on
the one hand, and his equally pervasive argument for the power of
fiction on the other. In Rushdie’s
work, fiction and narrative are powerful, transformative forces; narrative is less a means of representing
the world than a mode of apprehension, a metaphysical hammer
he uses to smash certainties of causality, a forge of the alternate real.
For Rushdie, fictions are the world
entire. They are also bound to
an enchanted mode of being and
knowing—a mode they both require
and sustain—explicitly at odds with
regnant theories of secularism,
modernity, and humanism.
In The Enchantress of Florence,
fictions are at once a kind of magic
and the source of a more sustained
ontological transformation. Summoning the novel’s titular trope,
fictions in The Enchantress of Florence are powerful forms of enchantment—and thus explicitly linked
to nonsecular and potentially heterodox forms of religiosity from
dark magic to paganism. From the
citizens of Florence to Akbar and the
denizens of Hindustan, Rushdie’s

ON RUSHDIE’S THE ENCHANTRESS OF FLORENCE
characters are unabashed addicts of
fantasy; they are credulous participants in a wide range of narrative
phantasmagoria, particularly when
they involve romance. In the most
endearing and symptomatic of these
fantasies, Akbar imagines a woman,
gives her a name, Jodha, and makes
her his queen in a sovereign act of
imagination. Wryly commenting
on his own penchant for creating
female literary characters who lean
more toward male sexual fantasy
than in the direction of plausible
mimesis, Jodha is “perfectly attentive . . . undemanding . . . endlessly
available,” in short, “a fantasy of
perfection” (46). Jodha’s imaginary
status, however, has no bearing on
her independent existence: like his
other wives, she has her own quarters, servants, and plays cards with
the emperor. “He gave her a name,
Jodha, and no man dared gainsay
him” (27). In this formulation,
Rushdie suggests that ontology is
as much a matter of power—and
fear of violence—as it is of evidence. As the stories of Jodha and
Qara Köz unfold, however, fictions
persistently exceed the bounds of
their origins and their authors. The
question of a character’s independent existence and free will becomes
a metonym for theological inquiry:
“[I]f God turned his face away from
his creation, Man, would Man simply cease to be?” (49). Akbar, prefiguring Benedict Anderson, imagines
Mughal Hindustan into existence by
commissioning a massive series of
paintings; he similarly commissions
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a new folio to canonize the lost princess Qara Köz and restore her to
the historical record.
After enchanting the emperor and
much of Sikri for years, Niccolò’s
wistful assertion that time operates
according to different laws in Mundus Novus (thus making it possible
for Qara Köz to stop time and for
Niccolò to be her son) founders on
the rocks of Akbar’s pragmatism.
In Akbar’s retelling of the story,
Niccolò is not Qara Köz’s son, but
the product of an incestuous union
between Ago and his own daughter,
born to him by Qara Köz’s servant
and “mirror.” For rather obscure
reasons, the revelation of incest signals the end, both literally and figuratively. Whereas Akbar considers
adopting Niccolò as his honorary
son in the jouissance of the mighthave-been, when the deferral of
narrative ends, Akbar bans Niccolò
from court, the lake ensuring the
survival of the city of Fatehpur
Sikri vanishes, and the novel closes
with Akbar contemplating his own
incestuous union with Qara Köz,
who appears to him as a kind of
material apparition summoned by
the emperor’s sovereign imagination. To put it another way, Akbar
refuses Niccolò’s particular alternate
version of history but subscribes—as
does Rushdie—to similar ontological commitments that pluralize “a”
historical record, seeing it as a text
open to continuous revision and
artistic appropriation. Dismissing
Niccolò’s story, Akbar seizes its
character, bearing her back with
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him across the permeable boundary between the fictive and the real.
The story-within-a-story structure
thus imbeds and rejects Niccolò’s
speculative genealogy in the very act
of affirming Rushdie’s own quite
similar conscription of historical
figures, leaving the status of the novel’s enabling conceit—the synchronous narrative history—ultimately
unstable.
Not only has The Enchantress of
Florence divorced humanism from
classicism, by depicting the encounter with fiction through the lens
of enchantment, Rushdie’s novel
severs the links between secularism
and its traditional allies: skepticism,
reason, and dispassionate analysis.
Sikri and Florence are thus humanist and secular in the limited senses
described previously, but they are
strikingly not places where the
retreat of religion parallels a fading
of what Charles Taylor and others
call the enchanted world of a presecular imagination. In fact, these
worlds are secular, humanist, and
modern to the extent that they are
novelistic. The rejection of militant
religiosity does not entail or require
a commensurate rejection of magic
and credulity, nor does it imply
an epistemological shift away from
an attitude of belief toward one of
skepticism. For far too long, scholars of the novel have abetted the
project of solidifying a tenuous
equivalence between the novel as
a genre and secularization as a
normative project. The Enchantress
of Florence presents a decidedly

nonsecular atheism, a modernity
divorced from rationalism, and a
vision of the encounter with fiction
as enchantment rather than the willing suspension of disbelief. Despite
its platitudes and pomposity, The
Enchantress of Florence helps us to
see why claims for the inherent secularism of the novel as a genre
will teach us little about either secularism or the novel; the novel can
instead assist in the effort to theorize
secularism, modernity, and humanism beyond the modes of reason and
the affects of disenchantment.
—Yale University

